Think Tanks
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Hire social media chiefs to put ‘Twitter snooping’ on a legal footing, think-tank tells police
- Demos advocates a senior officer in each force, and a central dedicated hub, to lead criminal intelligence on Twitter and Facebook
- Proposes regulatory framework to ensure police access to people’s social media information is proportionate and limited
- Calls for an ‘e-neighbourhood watch’ to improve community engagement
Police constabularies should install dedicated heads of social media to tackle crime and ensure responsible collection of online intelligence data, according to Demos’s Centre for the Analysis of Social Media (CASM).
The report, Policing in the Information Age, argues that more effective use of social networks like Twitter and Facebook would improve security and help police respond quickly to dynamic situations, such as the 2011 riots, by ‘crowd-sourcing’ events as they unfold.
It also proposes a clear regulatory framework that would clarify how and when police are able to access social media information for intelligence purposes, ensuring proportionate usage by police and putting it on a legal footing for the first time.
The social media chiefs would be responsible for co-ordinating their force’s online communication, enforcing the legal framework and ensuring 24-hour staffing of social media accounts. This could potentially allow the police to treat direct messages reporting a crime in the same manner as 999 calls.
The report cites figures that show criminals are increasingly using social media to plan and execute crimes, with 78 per cent of ex-burglars strongly believing thieves are using the online platforms to target properties and gather information about potential victims.
A legal framework for social media intelligence
Demos argues that to take advantage of the potential information and intelligence available, the police needs a clear, publicly argued set of regulations for how and when they can access social media for intelligence purposes.
The report proposes a regulatory framework that applies the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) to social media, which would give the police clear guidance on using online data for criminal intelligence.
Under this system, infiltrating a closed chat room to monitor conversations would require authorisation by a superintendent, while viewing private messages sent between individuals on Facebook could only be accessed with a warrant from the Secretary of State.
The researchers go on to recommend the creation of a central national hub for collating and utilising social media intelligence – known as SOCMINT – that would encourage greater co-operation between forces and provide specialist training for analysts and those working closely with the Crown Prosecution Service.
E-neighbourhood watch
The Demos paper argues that while the aftermath of the riots saw police forces increasing their social media presence, constabularies should do more to engage and reassure citizens in their area.
Analysis in the report finds that the majority of Twitter followers of police accounts are local to that force, strongly suggesting many use them as a reliable source of local information. Further data shows that women make up two-thirds (68%) of police forces’ Facebook fans, and a third of all followers are under 25.
Demos argue that a single senior head of social media at constabularies could facilitate ‘e-neighbourhood watch’ schemes that allow the public to share information and alert the police of suspicious activity quickly and easily.
One successful example of the use social media as a crime-stopping tool is the #shopalooter campaign set up after the riots by Greater Manchester Police, which encouraged members of the public to share pictures of criminal activity and led to hundreds of arrests within its first week.
Jamie Bartlett, Director of CASM at Demos, and co-author of the report said:
“Social media has transformed the way we communicate and opened up new opportunities for the police to fight crime and protect the public. While forces have started using social media to communicate with the public, the riots exposed a real blind spot when it comes to the police’s ability to monitor rapidly changing situations using it.
“Establishing one central command for monitoring social media intelligence and encouraging local constabularies use social media to work with law-abiding members of the community would go a long way to ensure officers are better equipped to meet the challenges of 21st century policing.
“However, just because something is on social media does not make it a free for all. A clear framework to make sure the way the police use social media is proportionate, accountable, and recognises the right to privacy, is essential if this potential is to be realised.”
NOTES TO EDITORS
The report, Policing in an information age: CASM policy paper, by Jamie Bartlett, Carl Miller, Jeremy Crump and Lynne Middleton is published by Demos on Tuesday 26 March 2013.
Download a copy of the report here: http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/policinginaninformationage
To arrange an interview with author please contact Rob Macpherson.
A proposed regulatory frame for SOCMINT (social media intelligence)
In this paper, Demos argues that the Home Office should create a clear legal framework for the collection and use of social media intelligence. This paper proposes the current 4-stage framework of the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act (RIPA) can be applied to SOCMINT, in the following way:
Type of SOCMINT and level of authorisation required |
Investigation in practice |
1) Open source SOCMINT
No interference with Article 8 rights to privacy, and no RIPA authorisation required.
|
Intelligence collected from publically available sources including:
|
2) Covert directed surveillance SOCMINT
Requires RIPA authorisation from a police superintendent .
|
Extracting private information about a person using data from a public domain such as:
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3) Covert human intelligence sources SOCMINT
Requires RIPA authorisation from a police superintendent
|
Establishing contact with an individual to obtain covert information from them:
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4) Intercept / covert intrusive surveillance SOCMINT
Falls under Chapter I of Part I of RIPA and requires a warrant from the Secretary of State (intercept) or Chief Constable (covert intrusive surveillance)
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Interfering with an individual’s sending equipment to monitor the content of their communications:
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MEDIA CONTACT
Rob Macpherson
rob.macpherson@demos.co.uk
020 7367 6325
(out of hours: 07554 424 137)