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Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board Recommends Joint Industry Project to Understand Explosion Mechanisms Further

GOVERNMENT NEWS NETWORK News Release issued by The Government News Network on 16 August 2007

Issued by the Government News Network on behalf of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board

Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board Recommends Joint Industry Project to Understand Explosion Mechanisms Further

Today, the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) is publishing the Explosion Mechanism Advisory Group report, outlining the work required for better understanding of the severe explosion that took place at the Buncefield oil depot on 11th December, 2005.

From the outset the Board wanted see a serious attempt made to understand the explosion mechanism that produced such a forceful explosion with high overpressures. The Board agreed that such understanding would provide further material assistance in guiding the design and operation of sites that store large quantities of vaporising flammable materials.

Professor Dougal Drysdale, an independent member of the Buncefield Board, convened an Advisory Group of explosion experts from academia and industry to begin this work and evaluate the evidence from the explosion.

Professor Drysdale said:

"Understanding the explosion further is a matter of international interest and I am pleased to say the Advisory Group has been able to identify lines of further investigation that give rise to a reasonable prospect that we will be able to explain the violence of the Buncefield explosion.

He continued: "I must stress that this is work in hand and not concluded. It will take some time, possibly several years, to complete the research necessary to deliver sound guidance to the Industry. We therefore believe that it is of the utmost importance that the recommendations in this report are implemented without delay."

Notes to Editors

1. The Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) has been overseeing a comprehensive investigation of the incident and has published a number of reports on its findings. One important aspect of the incident was that an explosion of unprecedented violence took place. The reports identify that the incident occurred following a spillage of unleaded petrol from one of the storage tanks.

2. In its 'Initial' report published in July 2006, the MIIB stated that:

'Further work is needed to research the actual mechanism for generating the unexpectedly high explosion over-pressures seen at Buncefield. This is a matter of keen international interest, and participation from a broad range of experts, as well as the industry, is essential to ensure the transparency and credibility of any research programme. The Board will consider further recommendations about the nature and scope of such work.'

In its report on 'Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites', published in March 2007, the MIIB stated that:

'We have asked the panel (Advisory Group) to advise us whether research is justified and if so the scope of such research, likely methods of funding it, and its governance arrangements, to ensure a satisfactory outcome.'

This report is the response to this request and provides a summary of the technical issues examined by the Advisory Group along with its conclusions and recommendations.

3. A proposal for the joint industry project has been prepared by the Advisory Group, with work recommended to start as soon as possible. The cost of the first phase of the project is estimated at not more than £200,000, to be completed in early 2008. Any additional experimental and theoretical work should then be complete in the following 18-24 months. The proposed governance of the project is a steering committee, made up of stakeholders from industry and the Health and Safety Executive as regulator.

4. The Buncefield Investigation Board was appointed by the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) to supervise the investigation into the explosions and fire at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, on 11 December 2005. The HSC directed the investigation using its powers under section 14(2)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, to be carried out jointly by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA). The Investigation Board is independent of HSE and EA, while including representatives of HSE and EA as well as independent experts. The Board is chaired by Lord Newton of Braintree.

5. The Competent Authority manage and enforce the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH) and comprise of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency in England and Wales (EA), and the HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland.

6. The primary investigation into whether any criminal offences have been committed is continuing. The investigators are required to follow all reasonable lines of enquiry. Once those enquiries are complete the Environment Agency and the Health and Safety Executive will carefully consider whether there is sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings and whether such proceedings are in the public interest. In view of the ongoing investigation into potential criminal offences the MIIB must ensure that no potential prejudice is caused to any party subject to the investigation and to any criminal proceedings which may be brought at a later date.

To access the Explosion Mechanism report, go to http://www.gnn.gov.uk or http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk