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The situation in Syria has dramatically shifted, radically altering a status quo that has largely remained in place for over four years, and toppling a leader against whom the country rebelled nearly 14 years ago.

Following a major 27 November surprise offensive into Assad regime-held territory by a collection of opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), opposition forces across the country have made astonishingly swift gains, using blitzkrieg tactics to keep Syrian government forces off balance and moving too fast to allow a sufficient reaction. Across the whole country, Assad’s forces have collapsed. 

It is hard to overstate how incredible the collapse has been, given the history of the war in Syria. Within four days of the first move on 28 November, rebels had taken control of Syria’s second city, Aleppo. Just over a week in, Hama fell. Homs, a critical crossroads between Syria’s north, its coast, its capital, and Lebanon’s Bekaa valley (a key supply route for Hezbollah) fell on 7 December. 

Lightning Strikes

The patchwork of other forces moving around the country is complex, but important to understand. In parallel, separate opposition forces to the south of Damascus, clearly coordinating with HTS, took the opportunity to move on the key cities of Deraa (where Syria’s protests first began in 2011) and Suwaida, making deals with regime forces to withdraw. In control of the Syria–Jordan border, they advanced swiftly on the capital, with thousands of irregular Syrian opposition fighters encircling the city and facing very limited resistance. 

Meanwhile, a less-covered but vital fight escalated in Syria’s east. To date, the US-backed and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been attempting to destroy Islamic State (which has been making a comeback) while defending themselves against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) forces. Evidence of deconfliction is clear between HTS and SDF and, over the past 10 days, the SDF have preserved escape corridors for civilians from Aleppo, deterred incursions by pro-Iranian militias across the Iraqi border and done deals with Assad regime forces to take over key locations. This indicates a wider opportunistic plan afoot to hold critical locations controlling the Iraqi border and east-west supply routes along the Euphrates, bolstering longer-term positions and limiting exposure to Turkish and Iranian-Iraqi attack. It is also notable that the SDF have largely ended up in control of territory which is among the most resource-rich in Syria – a key tradeable powerbroking element in the current post-Assad landscape.

SDF efforts have also linked up with other US-supported Free Syrian Army (FSA) units, who have swept north from the worst-kept secret in Syria – the US–FSA Al-Tanf base dominating the Jordan–Iraq–Syria triborder area. These have now taken control of the key desert city of Palmyra from regime troops, controlling the desert to the east of Damascus.

The US is directly involved, using air power to fire on Iraqi militias attempting to enter Syria. With regime forces’ withdrawal, this effectively means the US now has fire control over the whole of eastern Syria – a fact it has used to immediate effect, conducting ‘dozens‘ of airstrikes on Islamic State camps and operatives in former regime-held areas in an effort to use the interregnum to destroy the organisation to the fullest extent possible and prevent it from using the chaos to its advantage. 

Why Now?

As much as Syria is a proxy conflict, with external powers backing individual forces, this HTS offensive has several hallmarks of a patient effort to break out of a frozen status quo that had been decided and imposed from abroad years earlier. While an offensive out of Idlib had been expected, nothing like this was foreseen, and its catastrophic success is unexpected.

HTS has capitalised on a shifting geopolitical landscape, picking a moment when key Assad allies Russia and Iran are drained and preoccupied, and Hezbollah is devastated after a year of war with Israel

All of these developments come in the context of a four-year long status quo, characterised by the survival of the Assad regime following a decade of bloody civil war and backing from Russia, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, against opposition forces with (originally) Western and Gulf backing. It also follows major regional ructions, such as the devastating rise and fall of Islamic State, and the more recent transformation of the Assad regime into a narco-state benefiting from the manufacture and regional trade of Captagon, an illicit amphetamine flooding across the region which accounts for an unknown majority (and potentially multiples) of Syria’s current GDP. 

For HTS and other opposition units themselves, several more specific recent factors have influenced the success of this offensive. HTS has capitalised on a shifting geopolitical landscape, picking a moment when key Assad allies Russia and Iran are drained and preoccupied, and Hezbollah is devastated after a year of war with Israel. This has obviously reduced the immediate support available to a hollowed-out and corrupt Syrian government, and allowed rapid territorial gains. With the Syrian military putting up no significant resistance, key partners were not going to fight alone. But more than this, Assad’s behaviour – including his covert negotiations with Western countries and offers to eject Iranian forces from Syrian soil – will not have helped relations with those who once propped him up, nor did his rejection of every proposal made to him to make adjustments towards a political settlement of the conflict. It is now clear that Russia has been in contact with opposition groups to secure its critical military base interests in Syria. And both Iran and Russia have moderated the language they use towards the Syrian opposition forces (which includes groups regarded as terrorists by both), effectively consenting to a new political reality and looking to reach out to the new power(s) in Damascus.

In recent years, Idlib-based opposition movements had also improved their military capabilities. What was once a loose collective of Islamist rebel factions has transformed into a well-organised quasi-military force. The unification of fragmentary groups and the establishment of advanced military training, influenced by Western and Russian military doctrines, has created a diverse but coherent force. Benefiting from rampant arms smuggling and building an advanced arms manufacturing industry in Idlib, HTS has produced 3D-printed drones and missiles, enabling the execution of sophisticated mass attacks which overwhelmed the Assad regime's defences. 

HTS in a Position of National Leadership?

This leads to the question of whether the opposition are ready to rule, and have a plan to do so in a way that reflects the plurality of Syrian society. HTS leader Abu Muhammed al-Jolani was interviewed by CNN on 6 December, and said as much. He and HTS have spent years undergoing major rebranding efforts, including changing the group’s name from the Al-Nusra Front, severing ties with Al-Qa’ida (AQ) in 2016 and ruthlessly targeting several AQ affiliates and Islamic State in Syria, as well as mergers with other opposition groups. HTS has also tried to position itself as a more mainstream entity within the Syrian opposition; by all accounts, its approach is now more pragmatic. This, despite myriad former AQ links, the listing of HTS as a US Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US and Jolani’s own designation as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’, including a $10 million bounty. 

HTS has made efforts to reassure local populations and reach out to minority groups terrified of another Salafi-Jihadist organisation in a position of power in Syria (after the Islamic State experience). Understanding this fear, HTS has focused on communications about the status all minorities should hold in a post-Assad society, and taken some immediate actions to build confidence. For example, after capturing Aleppo, Jolani appeared personally to assure minorities of their protection and forbid fighters from entering homes, aiming to present HTS as a protector of all civilians (subsequently, there have been reports of residents calling on HTS to deal with looters, many of them from Turkish-backed SNA forces in the area). Other measures have also been taken to win over local populations, such as the sudden delivery of 24-hour electricity and the erection of new mobile phone masts. But these early indications will not reassure many – the proof will be in any agreements struck for longer-term governance, and the extent to which HTS is willing to share power – particularly with other, non-Salafi Jihadi movements and minorities like the Alawites, Kurds, Christians and Druze.

Also unclear is the opposition’s approach to dealing with former Assad regime loyalists. Military collapses and local dealmaking would suggest that efforts to adapt existing structures may be the initial approach. The rebels would be well advised to be inclusive; an Iraq 2003-style purge of the Baath party would result in the same sort of broad insurgency that sparked – and mass executions would be even worse. This will be a key question to watch. 

Given the array of other Syrian groups, sects and political ideologies that have operated in partnership on the march to Damascus, HTS will have to share power with other Syrians. Either we may be unsurprised to witness a descent into chaotic power struggles between factions, or – if homework has been done – we may be surprised by a less radical government than HTS’s terrorist pedigree would suggest. However, comparisons with the Taliban and other, more fragmented movements are too easily made – until demonstrated otherwise, a radical Islamic fundamentalist government must remain the core assumption if HTS seizes power over the heads of others. This would not bode well for a country crippled by sanctions and reliant on Iranian fuel and foreign humanitarian aid.

How Did Key Players Act?

Turkey

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken pains to say ‘I told you so’, suggesting that his shift in stance on ‘holding back’ HTS to date was due to Assad’s intransigence on negotiating future dynamics in Syria, particularly the conditions which would permit the return of millions of Syrians currently taking refuge on Turkish soil. But the Turkish role is potentially being inflated. HTS is not controlled by Turkey; its actions align with a message Erdogan wants to send to all stakeholders in Syria – particularly the Russians and the incoming Trump administration – that Turkey holds some of the most significant levers on influence across the region. HTS tactical alliances and strategic coordination with Turkish-backed rebel factions (particularly the SNA, a Turkish auxiliary operating in Syria’s north) have bolstered HTS's operational strength and facilitated some alignment, but so has careful coordination and deconfliction with the US-backed, Kurdish-led SDF, an implacable enemy of Turkey which its SNA partners continue to attack. If the SDF becomes too prominent in any post-Assad Syria, Turkey may again take military action (a scenario against which the SDF is currently positioning to defend).

Russia

Given Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria and the strategic costs it has sunk into the country since intervening in 2014, it might be surprising that Russia has not done more to defend Assad. But Russia’s strategic priority is clear – Ukraine. Russia has consolidated its positions and is watching opposition movements carefully – their forces are within 30km of Tartus and Hmeimim, key Russian naval and air force bases. It is clear that Russia is in contact with opposition forces and reports now suggest that Russian military bases and diplomatic missions have been ‘guaranteed security’. Nonetheless, there are indications of Russian concern over the speed of the rebel advance, with limited military movements out of Tartus and Hmeimim. A Russian diplomatic warning to its citizens to leave Syria by commercial means, meanwhile, was an indication that substantial assistance to the regime was not on the way. Russia would not pull troops from Ukraine to aid Assad in Syria, and even reports that the post-Wagner private military company ‘Africa Corps’ would be redirected to Syria were likely out of date; the battlefield situation moved so fast that Russian forces in Syria had to prioritise their own force protection.

Iran

These developments are critical for Iran, in that opposition control of Homs and the whole M5 highway (the north-south road linking Aleppo to Damascus, running along the Lebanese border) will disrupt Lebanese Hezbollah’s main supply routes. With Hezbollah severely weakened by 14 months of war with Israel, it needs resupply more than ever. Hezbollah will also be concerned about the threat of Sunni jihadist groups entering Lebanon’s north (a situation that has happened in the past, though in a recent statement HTS has denied any such plans). Weakening Hezbollah further by cutting it off from Syria could lead to de-escalation and a new political consensus in Lebanon, but it could equally feasibly pave the way for a further round of fighting with Israel if the fragile 60-day Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, which ends in January, falls apart. 

What Now?

The upending of the fragile status quo in Syria is linked with, and impacts, the instability that now extends from the Mediterranean to the borders of Afghanistan. Questions about the second-order effects are now being tested. On the basis of what key actors believe has happened, many Middle Eastern powerbrokers are positioning themselves to limit risks and manage the aftermath for their own pressing security priorities. 

For several states, uncertainty as to the political alignment of HTS and its allies, as well as whether it has really renounced the ideology of its AQ-affiliated roots, will be the immediate challenge in an already uncomfortably complex outlook. And this at a time when there are indications of a resurgence of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

It is now clear that some of Assad’s closest partners, including Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, were all convinced he was finished well before he stood down. In the end, the pace of the offensive was inexorable. Turkey is seen as a key influencer. Russian diplomats are taking care to blame the US, the UK and Israel for backing ‘Islamists’ – but not Turkey. Iran also has moderated the language its state media uses to discuss rebels, and has publicly said it ‘lost faith’ in Assad. This weekend’s gathering of Iranian, Russian and Turkish diplomats in Doha was the key opportunity to create an offramp agreement which protected at least some collective interests in the future stability of Syria, at the cost of an exit for Assad. The signatories to this agreement are all parties likely to maintain interests and take roles in Syria going forward.

Levantine history teaches us to be deeply concerned when dealing with such a fractious society in trauma after a decade of internecine war, torn in different directions by various foreign and non-state actors

These developments are particularly devastating blows to Iran, which has now lost a key ally, a commercial partner, a conduit to proxies in Lebanon and Palestine and a shadow battlefield with Israel in the space of a year. Iran’s regional influence and security structures are now at a nadir, returning its gaze to its home front. Longer-term, a rearrangement of power in Syria – particularly one which isolates Hezbollah – is likely to have major implications for Iran’s own decision-making. It could have implications for Iranian relations with Gulf countries. But in particular, it may influence the way Iran negotiates over its nuclear programme, and how it regards the timeline to the expiration of snapback sanctions in October 2025.

This links to US future posture. The US military has taken widespread actions in recent days to suppress Islamic State and prevent the entry of Iran-backed militias into Syria. It is also known to be taking actions to prevent Assad’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles from falling into the wrong hands. But Trump has made his views on Syria clear (perhaps in response to Assad’s entreaties?): ‘Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!’. This sets the direction of travel firmly towards a US step back – a welcome message to some in the region. It would simply be worth noting that US presidents who aim to avoid involvement in the Middle East invariably fail. 

Israel, meanwhile, considers itself a ‘free’ beneficiary of these developments, even if they risk the emergence of a more powerful, potentially extremist, Sunni power on its border. It has taken early, aggressive steps to secure land militarily in the Syrian Golan, arguing that with Assad gone historical agreements made with Syria no longer stand. And a widespread campaign of precision airstrikes is being conducted against major military bases, air defences and key scientific research centres across Syria (particularly those associated with Assad’s chemical weapons and missile programmes). In effect, Israel is demilitarising Syria to the extent possible, so that whoever ends up in charge can only present a limited threat (including, say, if Syrian airspace was required for strikes further afield). 

Conclusion

Levantine history teaches us to be deeply concerned when dealing with such a fractious society in trauma after a decade of internecine war, torn in different directions by various foreign and non-state actors. 

But in effect, developments since 27 November may have forced a de facto shift that leapfrogs the ‘ceasefire, political settlement and transition’ foreseen in 2015’s UN Security Council Resolution 2254. With Assad gone, so is a major obstacle to progress. Political deals in the four years since the situation in Syria somewhat stabilised have created new channels for dialogue. The bones of a plan to win a peace exist.

Beyond the geopolitical ‘so whats’, if asked, many, many Syrians will tell you they are overjoyed, sad, worried and hopeful all at once. Only one thing is for certain: Assad is gone, not with a bang but with a whimper. The opportunities are many; the risks are blindingly clear. We must hope that at least some lessons about pluralistic governance, human security and the centrality of the social contract have been learned from two decades of the global war on terror, the mis-named Arab ‘Spring’, Assad’s hyperviolent and cynical survival strategy, and a wretched collection of short-sighted policies from the international community in response. 

© Alexander Patterson, 2024, published by RUSI with permission of the author

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