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Much is unclear about Russia’s supposed new ballistic missile, but its use against Ukraine was more about political signalling than military utility in the war.

The launch on the morning of 21 November of what Ukrainian President Zelenskyy claimed was a Russian weapon with ‘all the characteristics’ of an intercontinental ballistic missile spurred concerns about nuclear escalation, especially after dramatic footage emerged of multiple projectiles striking Dnipro. Russian President Putin’s later announcement that the strike was a successful ‘test’ of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile called ‘Oreshnik’ (‘hazel tree’), with a ‘non-nuclear hypersonic capability’, explicitly linked the launch to Ukrainian use on Russian territory of Western-provided weapons like Storm Shadow cruise missiles and ATACMS. But nearly three weeks on, it appears likely that the aim was more to send a deterrence message to NATO members than to achieve tactical effects on the battlefield.

RS-26: A Blast from the Past

Some more details are now emerging about the missile used. The available information strongly indicates something with a longer range than the Iskanders used so far in the conflict, which have a range of up to 500 km, as it was almost certainly launched from the Kapustin Yar facility (around 800 km away). The RS-26 (SS-X-31 in NATO designations) is a much larger missile, generally referred to either as an intercontinental or an intermediate-range ballistic missile (ICBM or IRBM). The ambiguity stems from Russia’s decision to test the missile at just over the 5,500 km limit imposed by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty (although this test involved a single light warhead which arguably artificially enhanced the missile’s range). The RS-26 programme was supposed to have been paused or ended in 2017 in favour of developing other ways of launching hypersonic glide vehicles. However, a recent US Defence Intelligence Agency public report referred to it as having been significantly delayed, and the fact that US officials briefing in the immediate aftermath suggested the strike was conducted with some kind of new missile lends credence to the analysis that either the RS-26 programme has been resurrected or that elements of it have been used as the basis for developing a new missile. Videos of the strike on Dnipro appear to show multiple projectiles striking the city, as well as what may be decoys and debris. The number of projectiles (several dozen) may also be an indication that more than one missile was launched, although Ukrai nian intelligence has claimed that ‘six warheads’ were used, each deploying six sub-munitions. 

Does Classification Matter?

An ICBM is defined by convention as a ballistic missile which has a range in excess of 5,500 km. IRBMs generally have ranges of between 3,000 km and 5,500 km and are above medium-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles (like ATACMS or the Iskander). 

Some of the early US anonymous briefings were quick to dispute the Ukrainian characterisation of the 21 November strike as involving as an ICBM. This may be the result of a classification question, if the RS-26 was indeed involved: it was originally declared to be an ICBM, but later tests all indicated it was designed to carry heavier payloads for distances under 5,500 km, and Western officials suspected it was really an IRBM intended to breach the terms of the INF treaty, which prohibited ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km. The US withdrew from the treaty in 2019 on the grounds of Russia non-compliance (focused more on the 9M729 cruise missile than the RS-26). Emphasising the development and use here of an IRBM is another way of reminding observers of the history of Russia’s abuse of the arms control system, and a justification for current US developments in this area, even if in this case the Russians appeared to have given the US (scant) notification ahead of the launch.

Overkill or Overmatch?

The use of either a large IRBM or an ICBM would not necessarily be of huge military significance given that – while they are much faster (and thus harder to intercept) than shorter-range missiles – they tend to lack the accuracy to be employed with conventional payloads against many militarily relevant targets. For reference, the Chinese DF-26 IRBM has a circular error probability of around 150 m, as opposed to under 10 m for the 9M723 Iskander-M.

Russia has betrayed its anxiety over ongoing international support for Ukraine, and its playing of the nuclear card has undermined rather than reinforced its nuclear deterrent posture

If the target was a normal-sized building then many of the other weapons being used in Russia’s current onslaught, such as variants of the Shahed drone or KH-101 cruise missiles, are all likely to be more accurate and cost-effective. However, the large payloads that such a ballistic missile carries could allow one to be employed against some non-hardened and non-mobile targets (such as government buildings) with conventional warheads, despite their inaccuracy. It also demonstrates a capability to strike with a weapon that – at its maximum – could be launched well out of range of any Ukrainian ballistic or cruise missiles, either foreign-supplied or domestically produced. This would pose a significant challenge to the air defences that Ukraine has managed to assemble around cities and critical infrastructure. Systems such as Patriot can only engage an IRBM in the terminal phase, when intercepts are both difficult and involve the expenditure of more interceptors, which have to be fired in salvos because defenders do not have the time to observe whether an intercept has occurred before firing another (a ‘shoot, look, shoot approach’). Kapustin Yar could still be hit by some of the longest-range Ukrainian drones, so the facility is vulnerable, but Russia can emphasise the road-mobile nature of many of its weapons. 

Speak Loudly and Carry a Large Stick

However, the fact that countries only employ ICBMs (and many large IRBMs) in nuclear roles is symbolically more important, coming as it does on the back of a revised Russian nuclear doctrine which many read as lowering Russia’s nuclear threshold (even if it largely codified existing but unwritten policy). 

Existing Russia weapons being used against Ukraine (the Iskander short-range ballistic missile and Kinzhal and Kaliber cruise missiles) are already nuclear-capable, but a large missile like this sends a more potent message around potential nuclear use, as well as ‘punishing’ Ukraine for the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow. The primary audience for this message is probably NATO and the coalition of international backers of Ukraine, rather than Ukraine itself – a not-so-subtle reminder that Russia has a wider arsenal of different and larger missile types. If there was any doubt, Russian media helpfully released graphics estimating the flight times of Oreshnik missiles to several major European capitals. 

This comes in the context of a broader debate around longer-range missile capabilities in Europe, or rather the lack of such capabilities and the subsequent interest in what has become the European Long-range Strike Approach. Similarly, in July the US and Germany announced the deployment in 2026 of ground-launched missiles, including SM-6 and Tomahawk or ‘developmental hypersonic weapons’, ahead of ‘enduring stationing’ of such capabilities in Europe. It remains to see whether such plans survive in the new US administration, but it isn’t hard to draw a link between this debate and Russia’s use of the Oreshnik, not least as Putin’s statement after the strike not only referred to ATACMS and Storm Shadow use, but also the US plans. The boastful reference to the capabilities and future development of Russian IRBMs was presumably intended as a warning of Russia’s willingness to enter a missile arms ‘race’; whether it has the capacity to do so is another question.

Far from creating ambiguity and reducing NATO/European ambitions, increasingly bloodcurdling Russian threats have largely been ignored

There are more than trivial similarities to the Euromissile crisis here. The Russians have strong incentives to brandish their theatre-level nuclear advantages. The spectre of a nuclear conflict in Europe that is decoupled from a strategic exchange with the US (for example, if dual-capable aircraft were destroyed in a first strike by IRBMs) could pose a substantial risk to transatlantic cohesion. On the other hand, capabilities such as the Pershing II underscored the risks posed to Russia by medium-range systems which outpaced its early warning capabilities, and many of the systems to be deployed in Europe – including SM-6 and the long-range hypersonic weapon – replicate this dilemma (albeit with conventional missiles). Both sides are in effect opting for default strategies of, respectively, presenting the other with the spectre of a limited theatre-level exchange (a Russian threat aimed at a European audience) and the risk of counterforce enabled by decapitation (analogous to the spectre that Pershing II raised in the minds of Soviet decision-makers). Notably, the balance of power established in the 1980s was –  despite the political furore of the era – strategically stable in the sense that it conferred no advantage on either side and ended fears of decoupling. Even oft-cited fears about crisis instability were somewhat overblown, as a more careful reading of the Able Archer 83 crisis shows. A similar stability exists on the Korean Peninsula, where South Korea has offset North Korean nuclear weapons with its ‘three axis’ system combining integrated air and missile defence (to reduce the certainty of a successful strike) and conventional deep strike capabilities aimed at North Korea’s leadership and nuclear command and control. Putin’s claim last week that Oreshnik could be deployed to Belarus sometime later in 2025 should probably be seen in the same light, and as a fairly predictable follow-up to his 2023 statement on moving tactical nuclear weapons there.

Russia Cries Wolf

Where this leaves both Ukraine and wider strategic stability is open to interpretation. It seems highly unlikely that Ukraine will suddenly constrain itself in the use of ATACMS or Storm Shadow, at least under the current US administration, having spent months arguing for permission to use them on Russian territory. Images have already emerged of what is allegedly a further use to strike a Russian airbase. And for Russia, massed drone attacks and a mixture of ballistic and cruise missile strikes provide the most tactically useful riposte or form of pressure, especially heading into the winter. The use of Oreshnik is therefore unlikely to significantly alter calculations on how best to launch or deter long-range strikes by either side.

This exacerbates the deterrence dilemma for Russia in the more significant area, which is broader strategic stability. On the one hand, critical red lines have not been crossed by either side: NATO forces have not directly deployed into Ukraine to fight Russian forces, and Russia has not launched a conventional military attack on NATO countries. And at least some norms have been kept in place, with the Russian pre-launch notification being given to the US. On the other hand, international backers continue to provide support to Ukraine, even if sluggishly (perhaps a win for Russian messaging, but still problematic). Meanwhile, what looks like a Russian sabotage campaign in Europe continues, with no obvious response yet from European countries beyond more public exposure for the issue; and the launch is surely proof that the INF is dead, if anyone was clinging to hopes about a supposed Russian ‘moratorium’. This state of affairs looks superficially manageable, but Russia has betrayed its anxiety over ongoing international support for Ukraine, and its playing of the nuclear card has undermined rather than reinforced its nuclear deterrent posture. After all, Russia itself has been attacked, with a limited and wholly conventional response. 

In part, this reflects Russian resilience and willingness to prioritise progress in eastern Ukraine in the autumn. But if Russia were entirely relaxed about the international response to Ukraine and the issue of European missile capabilities, it need not have ‘clarified’ its nuclear policy by using a list of examples that have already been breached. Far from creating ambiguity and reducing NATO/European ambitions, increasingly bloodcurdling Russian threats have largely been ignored. If, as a result of this sabre-rattling, Russia’s adversaries assume that the sword will in fact remain sheathed, then Russia will have itself to blame – but this leaves open the possibility that it feels the pressure to escalate somehow with more threatening sabotage or disruption activity, or a more worrying conventional escalation against Ukraine. Finally, the significant expansion of Russia’s intermediate-range arsenal is a possibility if it can free up the resources, but with the Russian missile production rate currently at 130 a month, increasing the scale of production of an IRBM appears unlikely. While a theatre-level nuclear threat represents a challenge much as the SS-20 did, the value of the deployment could be nullified by the acceleration of European and US plans for both strike and missile defence capabilities. 

© RUSI, 2024

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