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The resolution of a recent diplomatic spat between Turkey and Western countries belies a growing precarity in their relations.

Diplomacy is the art of deescalating a crisis in such a way that each stakeholder can claim to have achieved what they wanted to, while not necessarily achieving any long-term solutions to the factors that led to that crisis.

We saw this at play in the skilled work of Turkish and US diplomats in finding a way out of the crisis that resulted from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanting to declare the ambassadors of 10 Western countries – including 7 NATO members – persona non grata over their public statement calling for the release of civil society figure Osman Kavala from prolonged detention. While the ambassadors have not backed down from their calls, they issued statements pointing to their adherence to the Vienna Conventions, which signalled indirectly their respect for domestic laws and sovereignty. This gave President Erdogan the chance to back down while showing his voters that he had taught the ambassadors a lesson.

Yet, Osman Kavala remains in prolonged detention. There are questions to be asked about how the Western embassies handled the entire process, and what it amounted to. Perhaps an awareness of the risks of such a statement was what led the UK Embassy in Ankara to choose not to join the signatories and stay out of the crisis. Erdogan, meanwhile, has not emerged from the crisis unscathed. His excessive reaction may have played well to a small portion of his domestic political audience, but the stand-off was only brought to an end by the skills of his advisers and Turkish diplomats. There is little to suggest that his primary audience – his voters – valued his reaction amid his declining popularity ratings, economic troubles and rising opposition momentum.

The diplomatic smiles and brief handshakes in G20 meetings last weekend mask a new era in relations with and attitudes towards Erdogan and Turkey

European and North American leaders are no strangers to polemics from President Erdogan designed for domestic audiences, as we have seen this cycle again and again before. However, the latest crisis went beyond the previous instances. The diplomatic smiles and brief handshakes in G20 meetings last weekend mask a new era in relations with and attitudes towards Erdogan and Turkey. He is no longer seen as difficult to deal with but as a negotiator with whom compromises can be found. His policies, such as his obsession with keeping interest rates low and pressuring the Central Bank, as well as his foreign policy, seem much more personal and reactionary than before. In fact, prior to the Biden–Erdogan meeting on the margins of the G20 last weekend, US officials publicly stated that Biden would warn Erdogan against ‘precipitous actions’. The news that Erdogan had decided not to attend COP26 on the basis that he was not happy with limits on security details prompted much eye-rolling, given that world leaders are discussing what to do about a planetary risk awaiting us all. Whether this was the real reason why he opted not to join COP26 after the G20 gathering in Rome like other leaders, or a sign of how the Rome meetings went, we do not know. But one continually hears questions in diplomatic circles about his health, whether he is becoming isolated in decision-making, and whether his actions are due to being in a vulnerable electoral and economic position, or are just the result of being weary and disconnected due to having been in power for far too long.

This shift might seem trivial in the long list of crises that we have seen between Erdogan and European and North American leaders and states over the last decade. But in most of the previous crises, there was a sense that a path could be found between conflicting interests, that some rational formulation or compromise could be reached beyond domestic political statements, and that key anchor points for maintaining relations remained firm – albeit without much warmth left. This is no longer the case. There is a creeping exhaustion and a sense that the benefits of trying to work with Erdogan might not add up when historic geopolitical shifts are unfolding across the region and globally. In fact, there are a number of countries trying to capitalise on Turkey’s growing isolation, which Erdogan has been trying to break out of.

There seem to be three principles left in the foreign policies of European and North American governments towards Turkey: compartmentalise (focus on tangible areas of work, trade and cooperation on shared concerns); contain (limit the risks of fallout and tensions); and, if possible, think long-term – since ultimately Turkey is much more complex and dynamic than any fait accompli suggests.

It is the last aspect that needs more prioritisation now than ever. Western countries should focus on and invest in society and engagement with all political, cultural and religious actors, and not reduce the country to its leader; focus on transparency in trade, money flows and economic interactions; prioritise multilateralism in engagement with Turkey over bilateral transactionalism, no matter how difficult that may be; deepen institutional engagement in strategic areas and investment; and proactively ensure healthy relations between NATO and Turkey.

There is a creeping exhaustion and a sense that the benefits of trying to work with Erdogan might not add up when historic geopolitical shifts are unfolding across the region and globally

For some, whatever will be, will be. Relations will break down further. It is now too late to regain what has been lost, and it is easy to see what more there is to lose. Yet, Turkey remains at the centre of a complex Venn diagram, with deteriorating relations posing direct risks on a long list of portfolios and issues. The country remains as complex and dynamic as ever. A commitment to compartmentalising, containing, engaging and investing long-term, while addressing key concerns strategically, does not amount to appeasement, legitimising or not caring about the problems we are confronted with. Nor does it preclude being a realist in acknowledging where things are and leaving conversations at that. Far from it: hindsight might prove cautious resilience and realism over the limits of engagement to be highly valuable amid worrying risks in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Balkans, and ongoing issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

In many ways, this is what consecutive UK governments, including the current one, have tried to do in their relations with Turkey. The increase in trade volume has been welcomed, now surpassing £16 billion – coming very close to the trade between the UK and India and Canada. Security and defence cooperation has also been deepening, alongside shared concerns on a broad range of issues, from Libya to Ukraine. Translating this into deepening influence and long-term outcomes for the wider NATO Alliance beyond the UK’s own interests remains tricky – yet efforts must continue.

Relations with Turkey are set to become much more precarious, and the domestic situation is set to become much more turbulent in the lead-up to the 2023 elections and 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. A train wreck over the latest crisis may have been avoided by Turkish and Western diplomats working quietly and against political pressure, but we have entered a worrying new phase that will only amplify the fallout of the next crisis. The calm after the storm is deceptive.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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